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Abstract. Business-to-business (B2B) interactions typically involve the
exchange of documents and messages to achieve specific goals. This has
led to the development of standards allowing the specification of complete
electronic conversations detailing the syntax, semantics and sequencing
of messages to be exchanged. As with paper based interactions, electronic
conversations may be subject to agreements between partners, implying
that both individual messages and entire conversations may have specific
requirements imposed upon them. Ideally, an enterprise should be able
to specify these requirements in a manner that is both declarative, free-
ing them from underlying technical concerns to focus solely on meeting
their business obligations, and compatible with existing B2B conversa-
tion standards, to minimise re-engineering of existing business processes.
A common such example is accountability, where all participants must
be held accountable for their actions during an exchange. Accountabil-
ity can be satisfied through the use of specific exchange protocols and
digitally signed evidence. However, business level clients may not, and
should not, have to be aware of these technical concerns when they can
be automated at lower levels of operation. This paper describes an ap-
proach to transparently satisfying requirements for B2B conversations
conducted using message oriented middleware, providing accountability
support as a major example.
1 Introduction
It is increasingly common to structure business-to-business (B2B) interactions
in terms of well-defined business message exchanges between loosely coupled
services. To this end open standards such as RosettaNet [14] and ebXML [11]
have been developed. These standards allow observable B2B conversations to be
defined in terms of the messages that must be exchanged in order to achieve
business objectives. Partners use such standards as the basis for agreement on
syntax, semantics and sequencing of messages; and the business processes upon
which they should execute.
This message based interaction presents message oriented middleware as the
ideal approach, providing a loosely coupled and asynchronous solution to mes-
sage delivery while also allowing additional functionality, declarative business
level requirements for example, to be delivered transparently to the end users.
As with their paper based analogues, electronic B2B interactions may be sub-
ject to agreements between participants, implying that both individial messages
and entire conversations may have specific requirements imposed upon them. At
the business level, these requirements should be both declarative, allowing par-
ticipants to free themselves from underlying technical concerns and focus entirely
on meeting their business obligations, and compatible with existing standards to
promote transparent interoperation and minimise the re-engineering of existing
business processes.
Taking accountability as major example requirement, participants may re-
quire that all collaborators in an interaction be held to account for their actions.
We can choose to satisfy accountability through the use of specific fair exchange
protocols involving digitally signed non-repudiation evidence. Non-repudiation
being formally defined as the inability for any participant to subsequently falsely
deny their participation in a specific exchange [5].
It is neither desirable, nor required, that business clients are aware of how
their requirements are being satisfied, they simply require that they are being
satisfied. We say it is neither desirable nor required as it is possible to derive
technical level requirements through the transformation of business level require-
ments using information including configuration, and available knowledge and
mappings.
It follows though, that for each declarative requirement to be supported,
necessary primitives must exist at lower levels of operation to facilitate their
satisfaction, for example, accountability may require non-repudiation and fair
exchange protocols and confidentiality may require specific encryption and sig-
nature algorithms.
This paper provides a technique for transparently supporting declarative
business level requirements on exchanges carried out over message oriented mid-
dleware using an extensible message gateway. Accountability will be supported
as an example requirement, satisfied through the implementation of fair non-
repudiation protocols and reliable evidence logging.
Section 2 provides a more thorough background to the problems tackled in
this paper and the techniques employed. Section 3 describes the design briefly
discusses the implementation. Section 4 describes related work and Section 5
presents the results, conclusions and future work.
2 Background
2.1 Business-to-Business Exchange Standards
Standardisation such as RosettaNet Partner Interface Process and Implemen-
tation Framework [14,13] and Electronic Business XML (ebXML) [11,10] has
allowed the specification of well defined B2B conversations at higher levels than
previously possible, we refer to these as conversations or exchanges interchange-
ably.
These standards support the specification of requirements on entire conver-
sations and individual messages at varying levels of flexibility. RosettaNet, for
example, accomodates binary attributes specifying non-repudiation or reliable
delivery and mandates the specific technical requirements to satisfy them1 but
makes no provision for supporting additional arbitrary meta-data regarding de-
livery. ebXML on the other hand supports both these binary style attributes
but also allows messages to be extensible and include arbitrary data, providing
it does not alter the observable business semantics.
While the situation is perhaps not ideal in cases such as RosettaNet, it pro-
vides a useful lowest common denominator in terms of supporting additional
requirements in a manner compatible with existing standards, specifically when
using message oriented middleware where intermediares are permitted.
2.2 Message oriented Middleware
There are various middleware specifications facilitating the execution of inter-
actions through the exchange of self-contained messages, we refer to these ap-
proaches as message oriented middleware. This approach has inherent advantages
such as asynchronicity and loose coupling and allows the routing of messages
through intermediaries to provide extended functionality in a manner transpar-
ent to both the sender and recipient.
To participate in a B2B conversation here a party simply has to construct a
valid business message, as per some well defined conversation, and pass it to the
middleware for delivery. The asynchronous nature of the system means recipients
need not be online at the time of transmission of a message and senders need
not necessarily remain online after the message has been sent, this is particularly
useful for both the long-lived nature of some B2B conversations and allowing
these interactions to be fault tolerant.
Most message oriented middleware supports the routing of messages through
intermediaries en route to their destination, this ability to intercept messages is
the enabling technique that allows additional functionality to be transparently
delivered and enables the realisation of the design outlined in this paper.
A M1
Enterprise A
BM1
Enterprise B
enc(M1)
Fig. 1. Message M1 is intercepted at the boundaries of Business A and Business B to
ensure the contents are encrypted whilst travelling between them.
1 E.g., RosettaNet Implementation Framework specifies that Voluntary Non-
Repudiation, as discussed later, must be used for the evidence exchange.
Figure 1 illustrates a simple but very useful example of interception pro-
viding transparent additional functionality, the message is intercepted before
it leaves Business A and encrypted, either by transforming M1 directly or en-
capsulating it in a container message. The message remains encrypted until it
enters Business B at which point it is automatically decrypted and delivered as
a plain message. Neither A or B are required to be aware this encryption occured
(i.e. transparency is maintained), yet there is assurance, to those who require it,
that encryption occured on the wire while all business logic remains completely
unchanged.
This ability to transform, restore and encapsulate messages along the wire al-
lows compatability to be maintained with rigid specifications such as RosettaNet
while additional requirements can still be satisfied.
2.3 Accountability as a Business Requirement
Accountability is commonly identified as a vital requirement of B2B interactions
[3,8,6], where all participants must be held to account for, and in acknowledge-
ment of their actions during an exchange.
Accountability is of particular importance to B2B interactions where collabo-
rating participants are working towards one or more mutually beneficial business
goals. Each participant requires that their own interests are protected in the con-
text of the collaboration, specifically that their own contributions are recognized;
and that partner collaborators are held accountable for their actions.
Accountability as a declarative requirement can be satisfied through the use
of specific non-repudiation and fair exchange protocols alongside the mainte-
nance of an irrefutible evidence log for use in dispute resolution, .
Non-repudiation protocols are responsible for the generation and structured
exchange of digitally signed evidence, minimally requiring trusted evidence prov-
ing irrefutably that a given message originated from a specific sender and coun-
terpart evidence proving irrefutably that the message was received by the in-
tended recipient.
While non-repudiation is required, it is not sufficient for accountability in
B2B interactions. The selective receipt problem [2] illustrates an example in
which a recipient may refuse to deliver their proof of receipt after they have
obtained both a confidential message and its proof of origin evidence, placing
the sender at a disadvantage as a direct result of their compliance.
Fairness is formally described by Markowitch et al. [6] as the property that
“For a fixed level of quality over the communication channels, at the end of an
exchange protocol run, either all involved parties obtain their expected items or
none, even a part, of the information to be exchanged is revealed.”, it is one of
three mandatory properties for any exchange system wishing to classify itself as
secure.
The incorporation of fairness into non-repudiation protocols ensures the digi-
tal evidence is exchanged in a manner that prevents any participant being placed
at a disadvantage as a result of correct behaviour, alleviating issues such as the
selective receipt problem.
Using the aforementioned to guarantee accountability in a fair manner we can
benefit B2B interactions by compelling participants to behave correctly, safe in
the knowledge that they will not be disadvantaged as a result of compliance
[2,1,16].
2.4 Non-repudiation Classifications
Kremer et al [5] conducted an intensive survey of available non-repudiation pro-
tocols and classified each according to level of fairness provided and level of
involvement from the TTP. We assume in this paper that non-repudiation is
applied for a message exchange between two parties and that no party will act
against their own interests. All of the protocols discussed rely on two key types
of evidence:
Non-repudiation of Origin (NRO) Evidence that can be used to unambigu-
ously prove that a signatory is the author of a specific message.
Non-repudiation of Receipt (NRR) Evidence that can be used to unam-
biguously prove that a signatory received a specific message, also containing
the corresponding NRO evidence for that message.
The survey goes on to provide a fine grained definition of fairness covering three
major classifications. Weak fairness ensures that if any party does not receive
information or evidence they are entitled to, they at least receive proof of this
fact for use in dispute resolution. Strong fairness states that all participants are
able to retrieve the information and evidence they are entitled to at the end
of a protocol run, or none can. True fairness includes strong fairness with the
added caveat that, for a successful protocol execution, all evidence generated
is done so independently of how the protocol executed (i.e. evidence generated
without TTP intervention is indistinguishable from when the TTP was invoked
to enforce the exchange).
TTP involvement is classified as one of three possibilities including inline
where the TTP is involved in every message transmission, online where the
TTP is involved in at least every protocol execution and offline where the TTP
is involved only when a dispute is raised.
A specialised type of TTP known as a Timestamping Authority (TSA) may
be used to provide trusted timestamps, proof that a piece of information was wit-
nessed at a specific time by a mutually trusted party. These trusted timestamps
are used to ensure that evidence which may have been logged for a long period
of time was valid at time of generation, even in the face of revoked certificates
and keys, for example.
2.5 Coffey-Saidha Non-repudiation Protocol
The most desirable protocol as per the aforementioned classifications is one pro-
viding true fairness through the use of an offline TTP. Such a scheme incurs
significant complexity however and this paper will focus initially on an imple-
mentation of the Coffey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol with support for addi-
tional protocols to be added seamlessly in the future. The Coffey-Saidha protocol
provides strong fairness through the use of an inline TTP and is described in
figure 2.
1 A → TTP : encTTP (id, A, B, m, NRO , tsTSA (NRO))
2 TTP → B : id, A, B, h (NRO)
3 B → TTP : encTTP (id, A, B, NRR, tsTSA (NRR))
4 TTP → B : id, A, B, m, NRO , tsTSA (NRO)
5 TTP → A : id, A, B, NRR, tsTSA (NRR)
Fig. 2. Coffey-Saidha in-line TTP fair exchange protocol.
Table 1 details the notation and definitions required to describe the exchange
protocol.
Notation Description
id unique protocol run identifier
h (x) secure hash of x
i, j concatenation of items i and j
P → Q : m P sends m to Q
sigP (x) P ’s digital signature on x
encP (x) encryption of x with P ’s public key
Tg Timestamp for generation of some information
tsTSA (x)
Timestamp on x generated by a TSA bearing
witness to the time of generation of information x
Token Definition
NRO sigA (id, A, B, m)
NRR sigB (id, A, B, h (NRO))
tsTSA (x) {Tg, sigTSA (x, Tg)}
Table 1. Notation and Definitions for protocol elements.
A successful execution of the Coffey-Saidha protocol using an inline TTP will
complete in 5 steps with both parties obtaining both NRO and NRR evidence for
the message m being exchanged, the use of encryption in steps 1 and 3 prevents
A and B from obtaining NRO and NRR evidence prematurely and gaining an
unfair advantage.
A detailed explanation of the protocol and all of its steps, including abort
and timeout sub-protocols can be found in [1].
3 Design and Implementation
A
MSA
events  
M1
Enterprise A
ACK
Fig. 3. MSA collaborates
on behalf of A with external
parties to fairly exchange
M1 and ACK .
The design comprises a messaging service (MS )
located at the boundary of an organisation. This
service acts as a gateway through which all mes-
sages are routed and requirements are satisfied,
collaborating with other services as necessary, as
represented in figure 3.
This messaging gateway pattern is well recog-
nised in enterprise system design [4] and is in-
tended to allow additional functionality to be de-
livered transparently as an intermediary. Non-
repudiation will be used to provide accountability
as an example of business level requirement sup-
port within the gateway.
Figure 3 introduces an important distinction
in the form of business messages (illustrated by
solid lines) and protocol (or technical) messages
(dashed lines). Clients such as A are only expected to produce and consume
business messages and protocol messages are generated by the messaging service.
To maintain transparency, clients are never required to understand protocol
messages although they may choose to do so.
3.1 Message Processors and Handlers
Within an instance of the messaging service as shown in figure 3, messages
that have been intercepted must be processed in order to both assess which
requirements have been specified and go about satisfying them. The design does
this in terms of message processors, intended to be implemented in a modular
fashion so they may be logically grouped to render specific functionality.
We refer to this grouping of a set of message processors as a handler, each
handler is configured with an ordered list of message processors through which
messages can be sequentially passed. In order to control flow of messages through
the messaging service, handlers are connected via locations such as queues and
topics. The design specifies four types of connected locations for a single handler:
Input The mandatory input location specifies where messages that should be
intercepted are deposited.
Output The optional output location specifies where messages should be de-
posited once processing has completed.
Signal The optional signal topic specifies a location into which significant events
during a handler’s execution are deposited for interested subscribers.
Audit The optional audit topic specifies a location into which verbatim copies
of messages generated during a handler’s execution are also deposited.
MSA
Pre-Process Handler
QBusinessToSend P1 P2
Process Handler
P3 P4Q ProtocolStart
P6 P5
Protocol
Execution
QProtocolFinish
Post-Process Handler
P8 P7QBusinessToRecv
Fig. 4. An example of the messaging service configured with three handlers each with
a message processor chain.
Figure 4 illustrates a particularly useful example configuration in which pro-
cessors are partitioned according to their relationship to the execution of any
protocol (i.e. pre-processing, processing and post-processing). This method of
partitioning will be used to facilitate functionality discussed later in this section.
This figure omits the use of signal and audit topics, their use is also discussed
later in this section.
All handlers and their aggregate message processors are configured on a per
service basis, this configuration for each instance also contains an identifier,
assumed to be as unique as required, used to facilitate identification amongst
collaborating parties.
3.2 Signal and Audit Topics
The previous section introduced signal and audit topics with regards to handlers
and described their intended use. This design was intended to decouple the
processors from event notification and auditing concerns (e.g. logging). In the
case of the signal (or event) notification, processors simply emit their events
to their encapsulating handler, these events are delivered to the signal topic, if
specified, and interested participants are able to subscribe as desired.
For the audit topic, receiving verbatim copies of messages generated through
execution allows logging to occur in a completely decoupled manner. Loggers may
be created arbitrarily as subscribers to this audit topic, internally by editing the
configuration of the messaging service or externally by simply subscribing to the
topic.
It is intended that these topics may only be accessed by authorised par-
ties to prevent vital information (e.g. non-repudiation evidence) being leaked to
unauthorised subscribers.
3.3 Conversation Tracking and Awareness
The design so far illustrates how message processors are able to work on in-
tercepted messages and how audit topics may be associated with handlers to
provide logging. A vital capability in such a messaging service must be the abil-
ity to correlate groups of messages, particularly into which B2B conversation
or specific protocol execution they belong. To solve this, we have identified a
minimal set of tracking identifiers to support useful functionality:
Conversation Identifier This identifier is used to mark a message as belong-
ing to a specific B2B conversation. All messages must contain this identifier.
Protocol Identifier This identifier is used to mark that a message is part of a
specific protocol execution. Only protocol messages must contain this iden-
tifier, it makes no sense for business messages to contain this information.
Message Identifier This identifier is used to uniquely identify each message,
all messages must contain this identifier.
These identifiers facilitate more useful lookups of logged messages and allow
conversation and protocol executions to be tracked as they occur.
3.4 Deriving Technical from Business Requirements
As with the message classifications described at the beginning of section 3, it
is useful to classify requirements in terms of business level and protocol (or
technical) level. To be useful, a business level requirement should be declarative
(i.e. specify the what rather than the how) but also have a complete mapping
into technical requirements capable of satisfying it.
The pre- and post-processing phases of protocol execution as described in
section 3.1 provide an ideal place within the messaging service to perform the
transformation between these business and technical level requirements. The
pre-processor will take business requirements and, using configuration and avail-
able knowledge, derive technical requirements satisfiable by the service. The
post-processor will transform these back into business requirements allowing the
underlying technical concerns to remain hidden from the enterprise.
Using accountability as the major example, we require only a single require-
ment at the business level. This must answer the question “Is accountability
required for this individual message?”. For a business message where this is re-
quired, the necessary technical requirements and data can be derivedand used
to execute the Coffey-Saidha protocol as discussed in this paper, the following
data is required to facilitate protocol execution:
Non-repudiation Protocol Which specific non-repudiation protocol is to be
executed.
TTP Identities The TTP and TSA to be used in the non-repudiable exchange
must be explicitly identified.
Sender and Recipient To sender and recipient in the non-repudiable exchange
must be explicitly identified.
An advantage of performing these transformations in the pre- and post-processing
phases is that default technical requirements may be injected where none are
specified at the business level. This allows a service to be configured to execute
fair exchange unless instructed otherwise, for example.
A significant concern for these declarative annotations, however, is their de-
scriptiveness and interpreted meaning, this is discussed in section 5.3 regarding
future work.
3.5 Accountability as an Example
Section 3.1 and figure 4 demonstrated the partitioning of message processors
based on classifying their role as a pre-processer, processor or post-processor
with regards to protocol execution. This partitioning allows the design to achieve
accountability through the use of non-repudiation implemented across three mes-
sage processors named NRPreProcess, NRPostProcess and NRProcess. Each of
these processors to be located within their respective protocol phase handler
(pre-, post- and process) as shown in 5 and described in detail thereafter.
It is important to note that while intermediate locations between handlers are
not shown in figure 5, a line directly connecting two handlers (e.g. ’Pre-process’
to ’Protocol’) implies the existence of one.
A
MSA
Msend
Protocol
Handler
Pre-process
Handler
Post-process
Handler
QBusinessToSend Q
Protocol
Queue
QBusinessToRecvMrecv
T
Sig
n
al
Topic
T
Audit
Topic
Remote exchanges continue
until protocol completes.
Enterprise A
Protocol
Starts
Reliable
Evidence
Logger
Fig. 5. Handler configuration inside MSA supporting NR protocol execution.
NRPreProcess: This processor is responsible for checking each intercepted
message to see if accountability is required and, if so, to derive the technical
requirements and meta-data discussed in section 3.4.
NRProcess: Once the necessary technical information has been derived, this
processer is responsible for executing the correct non-repudiable exchange
protocol. An important note is that the output location for the NR pro-
cessing handler will only be used when a single run of an invoked protocol
has completed, additional procotol messages are likely to be exchanged with
other participants (e.g. TTP, TSA and the collaborating participant) before
this completion occurs.
NRPostProcess: Post-processing is the natural counterpart to the pre-processing.
For accountability this means taking the result of a protocol execution and
transforming it back into a business message for the recipient, to maintain
transparency.
These three processors facilitate the execution of fair non-repudiable exchange
protocols, the final requirement for fair non-repudiable exchange is the mainte-
nance of an irrefutible audit trail. This is demonstrated in figure 5 by the sub-
scription of a reliable evidence logger to the audit topic, which is connected to
the protocol handler. This logger will receive copies of all protocol messages, in-
cluding those containing digitally signed, and trusted non-repudiation evidence.
This modular design means that a messaging service needs only be config-
ured with pre- and post-processing handlers if it is to deal with business level
messages, their function of transforming between business and protocol message
ensures clients are only ever exposed to business messages, even if fair exchange
occured at the protocol message level.
A useful result of this is that NR TTPs and TSAs, who are only ever con-
cerned with protocol level messages, may be configured as instances of the mes-
saging service containing only a protocol handler.
3.6 Handling Business and Technical Level Failures
As with both requirements and messages, it is useful to define failures in terms
of business level and technical level.
A business level failure includes scenarios such as failure to process (or re-
spond) a message before a specified deadline or a business message being seman-
tically invalid, for example. Were the messaging service in this paper to include
a knowledge set comprising domain specific message exchange patterns (e.g. spe-
cific RosettaNet PIPs), generalised message exchange patterns (e.g. one and two-
way asynchronous interactions in the RosettaNet Implementation Framework)
and ongoing conversations it is feasible that the service could take automatic
action to attempt to compensate with specific business failures (e.g. re-delivery
in the case of a missed deadline). As it stands, the service opts to allow the
business level clients within an enterprise deal with the detection and reaction
to these situations, this situation can be improved on by the discussed related
and future work.
Technical failures present an altogether more complex issue to deal with, the
struggle comes in dealing with them appropriately while attempting to maintain
transparency to the business level clients within an enterprise. There may be
times when a technical failure should be made known to a business client (e.g. fair
non-repudiable exchange will never be possible with this participant) but doing
so requires the enterprise to understand the underlying technical complexities, it
may also be possible to use the signal topic to counter this issue. The messaging
service could opt to attempt no automatic recovery in such situations and hope
a business failure is eventually raised, or attempt to raise a business failure itself.
The former is far from desirable and the latter would again require knowledge
of the possible and ongoing conversations to invoke the correct business level
conversations.
4 Related Work
The concept of supporting business conversations using intermediares in middle-
ware is an explored approach, works relevant to this paper, are described in this
section.
In 2007, Molina et al described an approach to guaranteeing consistent out-
comes for B2B conversations carried out using message oriented middleware [8].
The approach provides synchronisation at both the protocol level and at the
business level to collate individual outcomes and calculate the actual global out-
come. This can be used to prevent inconsistent states occuring at the business
level and alleviate the need for potentially slow and expensive business level
compensation to be executed. The approach could be integrated into the mes-
saging service although its use would mandate the deployment of the messaging
service within each enterprise, this is discussed more in section 5.3.
In 2009, Strano detailed the design and implementation of support for specifi-
cation and monitoring of electronic business contracts [15]. This is facilitated by
a centralised monitor being fed events from participating business clients, using
these events and specified contracts the monitor can decide whether the partici-
pants are meeting their obligations to contracts or infringing upon the rights of
others. The messaging service described in section 3 could easily be adapted to
transmit events based on the signal and audit topics to this centralised monitor,
and use its output to better support governance of B2B conversations.
A possible issue with this work is that the events being fed to the centralised
monitor may be generated by the participants themselves and thus, be untrust-
worthy. This issue can be directly addressed through the use of non-repudiation
evidence. If, at the end of each B2B conversation, we enforce the non-repudiable
exchange of the final message with the caveat that the NRO and NRR contain
a hash of every message this provides evidence that is both trusted and cryp-
tographically bound to the entire conversation. Both participants could use this
to provide some form of trusted input to be used as evidence to the centralised
monitor. The messaging service described in this paper is capable of generating
this evidence, but no provisions are made for interacting with the centralised
monitor.
In 2006, Cook et al described a Web-Services specification for fair non-
repuditation [3], providing a set of standards that allow individual messages
to be intercepted transparently and exchanged in a non-repudiable manner, this
work focuses solely on non-repudiation as the business requirement, providing
multiple protocols and extension points for other non-repudiation protocols to
be used. This work allows business level validation of messages to feed directly
into the non-repudiation protocol phase meaning semantically and syntactically
invalid business messages can be used to prevent unnecessary exchanges taking
place, something this paper has not considered.
In 2004, the FIDES project described a complete version of their e-commerce
security solution including the capability for fair non-repudiable exchange within
private communities [9], the capabilities in this system are dependent upon the
use of a specific client into which business documents are loaded and the re-
cipient(s) specified, while this system is solves the issue of ensuring a recipient
is capable of executing fair non-repudiable exchange, it is far from ideal as the
client is completely opaque to the user and also means automating with existing
B2B conversation specifications and implemented services becomes a non-trivial
issue.
In 2007, Parkin et al provided an implementation using JMS to deliver volun-
tary non-repudiation on business messages being exchanged [12]. The approach
was similar to that taken in this paper, the use of a gateway to intercept all
business messages and provide voluntary non-repudiation on them all transpar-
ently by attaching and extracting digital evidence from outgoing and incoming
business messages respectively. The approach described in this paper can be
seen as a direct extension of this work, providing a more feature rich gateway
(e.g. arbitrary processor implementation and conversational tracking) and also
rendering strongly fair non-repudiation in addition to voluntary.
5 Results, Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Resulting Implementation
The design shown in section 3 was implemented using JMS as the message
oriented middleware. This use assumes all messages are JMS messages, allowing
all requirements to be specified as key-value property pairs where the value is
permitted to be any primitive Java type, or a String object. There were some
minor caveats to overcome including a lack of wire-format, no standardised URI
scheme [7] and no cryptographic primitives in the JMS API, enterprise design
patterns were used to construct vendor independent solutions to these issues and
allow the functionality to be delivered as designed.
The prototype has been tested and works successfully for two correctly behav-
ing instances of the messaging service exchange messages in a fair non-repudiable
manner.
5.2 Conclusions
The work presented in this paper is a design engineered towards supporting the
satisfaction of declarative business level requirements. Accountability was used
as the major example and satisfied through the execution of fair non-repudiation
protocols. The design is flexible enough, allowing additional business and techni-
cal requirements to be supported transparently and maintaining compatability
with existing standards including RosettaNet and ebXML.
The design and approach taken in this paper do have some serious ramifica-
tions however, first and foremost is the the compatability of both the declarative
requirements and the way in which they are satisfied with the other partners.
This paper (and the design in it) have adopted a very specific meaning for
accountability and a way to satisfy that, using the Coffey-Saidha protocol. It
would be unreasonable to assume all possible participants deploy our messaging
service, meaning that accountability may mean something entirely different (or
nothing at all) to another party. A possible solution to this is that the messaging
service brokers with participants to attempt to arrive at some mutually accept-
able definition or determines protocol support and continues to interact where
possible.
Another significant issue is the handling of business and technical failures,
while they have been considered, they have not been addressed in a particularly
graceful or satisfying manner.
5.3 Future Work
Immediate future work would include improving the capabilities of the service,
particularly adding compatability with the consistency support described in sec-
tion 4. Integration with the centralised monitor as described in the related work
section would be achievable by creating a message processor within the mes-
saging service to generate and supply the trusted events as required. At the
non-repudiation protocol level the Coffey-Saidha implementation requires the
inclusion of abort and error sub-protocol support to be truly useful, implying
the need for support of deadlines and timeouts.
The example requirements specified in this paper are done so on a per mes-
sage basis, the issue of requirements on conversations has not been explicitly
addressed but could be easily facilitated using knowledge about possible conver-
sations and the requirements they have specified.
Further work may include integration with an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB),
completely removing the concern for underlying message format and allowing
the system access to intercept all outgoing and incoming messages of any type.
The integration of a rules engine in the messaging service could support pred-
icates over conversations, messages and links (i.e. knowledge about all exchanges
that have occured with a specific business partner). These predicates could pos-
sibly be translated from business requirements to further alleviate technical con-
cerns for the business client.
As more declarative requirements are supported, it may become desired to
provide an interface on to the messaging service allowing a plain business message
to be passed in and business level requirements specified as parameters rather
than just exposing a queue or topic. There is an obvious tradeoff here between
maintaining transparency versus providing a possibly more descriptive interface.
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